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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES H. HUPP, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
Case No. 16603 
HONORABLE S. MARK JOHNSON, 
Judge of the Circuit Court, 
State of Utah, Davis County, 
Bountiful Department, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner contends that the Court erred in its 
original determination of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE UTAH SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FINDING ON 
APPEAL THAT THE OFFENSES INVOLVED HEREIN DID 
NOT CONSTITUTE A "SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE" 
UNDER § 76-1-401 ET SEQ. (1953), AS AMENDED 
& 76-1-401 defines a "single criminal episode as 
follows: 
. all conduct which is closely related in time 
and is incident to an attempt to an accomplishment 
of a single criminal objective. (Emphasis added.) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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A. Petitioner's Conduct Constituted Offenses Which 
Were Clearly Closely Related in Time 
Petitioner respectfully submits that the opinion of 
this Court on appeal is contradicto"ry in that in the first 
paragraph it states that all four citations were issued at 
the same time, while the fifth paragraph states that the 
citations charge separage, independent offenses which were 
committed at different times. Certainly all are separate 
offenses, as is necessary in order for them to be joined 
under the "single criminal episode" statute. The four 
offenses charged were all committed at 1:50 in the morning 
of January 5, 1979; and thus, as is conceded in the 
Respondent's Appeal Brief on pages 2 and 4, the four 
separate violations of the Motor Vehicle Code involved 
driving or operating the vehicle and "the conduct of 
appellant giving rise to the charges was 'closely related 
in time.'" 
The Colorado Court of Appeals addressed a similar 
question concerning its compulsory joinder statute in Ruth 
2 
v. The County Court In and For the County of El Paso, Colo. 
App., 563 P.2d 956 (1976). In that case, plaintiff had 
pleaded guilty to operating a vehicle without a valid 
operating license, and when separately prosecuted for two 
other traffic offenses arising out of the same incident, 
asked for a writ of prohibition to prevent the county court 
from proceeding further against him. The date, time, and 
location of the offense were the same in each charge, and 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
the Appeals Court found that where the statute requires 
that there must be one prosecution for all offenses "based 
on the same act or series of acts arising from the same 
criminal episode," that the county court was barred from 
separate prosecution of those charges. The court found 
that "the charges alleged in this case were all based on 
the violation of state statutes, arise from a single 
episode, and were to be prosecuted in the county court. 
. . . The compulsory joinder statute requires that 
plaintiff be granted the requested relief." (Emphasis 
added.) (For the convenience of the Court, a copy of the 
Colorado case has been appended to this Petition for 
Rehearing.) 
That petitioner's offenses were "closely related in 
time" is also confirmed by the California Supreme Court's 
finding in In re Hayes, 75 Cal. Rptr. 790, 451 P.2d 430 
(1969), that where a motorist was charged with driving 
while his license was suspended and driving under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor in the same incident, the 
offenses occurred simultaneously. Thus petitioner asks the 
Court to correct its opinion and find that the offenses 
were closely related in time, both in fact and in law. 
B. Petitioner's Offenses Were Committed Incident 
To a Single Criminal Objective 
The offenses with which petitioner was charged require, 
as an essential element, and indeed have as their only 
~ element, the driving of the vehicle. Further, none 
of the offenses herein charged is illegal until such time 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
as it is combined with the driving of the vehicle. 
Thus, at the time of his arrest, petitioner was 
operating his vehicle with the only criminal objective 
he could have had under these statutes, the single 
criminal objective of operating his vehicle illegally. 
4 
"Criminal objective" is to be defined in terms of the 
act by which the law is broken, and not by the elements of 
the offense which must be proved. This position is relied 
on in In re Hayes, supra. There the Court was addressing 
itself to that part of § 654 of the California Code which 
proscribes multiple punishments for separate offenses 
arising under a single criminal episode. However, in 
differentiating the section which precludes multiple 
prosecutions in that statute, the California Supreme Court 
noted that it had, in People v. Morris in 1965, in a 
similar factual situation, declared that § 654 proscribed 
multiple prosecutions for drunk driving and an invalid 
license. The Court in Morris, supra, stated that the test 
for deciding whether the separate offenses charged amounted 
to a single criminal episode was whether the neutral common 
act was "essential" to all offenses, rather than requiring 
that the common conduct be a "criminal act." Thus, while 
the majority of the Court in In re Hayes found that a 
"crimi~al act" test was proper under the section proscribi~ 
double punishment, the purposes of the two sections of 
the Code were different, and thus that "double prosecution 
may be precluded even when double punishment is permissible." 
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The Colorado Court of Appeals, in Ruth v. The County 
court In and For the County of El Paso, supra, implicitly 
agrees with this view when it states that 
. . . all such offenses must be prosecuted as a 
single prosecution when 'based on the same act 
or series of acts arising from the same criminal 
episode.' Offenses not so joined cannot be the 
subject of a later prosecution. . • • As to 
defendants' assertion that the offenses with which 
plaintiff was charged did not possess the requisite 
commonality so as to fall within the scope of [the 
compulsory joinder statute] we conclude that • • • 
the test of identity of issues has been satisfied. 
The drafts of the Model Penal Code, and the American 
Bar Association, Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, 
5 
Joinder and Severance, both include as alternative standards 
for decision on whether joinder is required, those offenses 
based on the same "conduct" or those offenses with a 
"single criminal objective." In this instance, petitioner's 
conduct fits the language of these drafts. 
For an expanded discussion of the optimum scope of 
criminal prosecution and the statutory joinder of offenses 
for purposes of prosecution, see: Caraway, "Pervasive 
Multiple Offense Problems--A Policy Analysis, "Utah L. Rev. 
1971:105 Spr. '71. See also, "Note: Multiple Prosecution 
and Punishment of Unitary Criminal Conduct--Minn. Statute 
§ 609.035," Minn. L. Rev. 56:646 May '71; and Collier, 
"Multiple Prosecutions When Conduct Constitutes More Than 
One Offense," Ohio N. L. Rev. 2:23-32 '74. 
In illustrating its discussion, the Minnesota Law 
Review article points out that 
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Where several traffic charges result from a 
single instance of the operation of an auto-
mobile, the defendant's conduct should be 
within the scope of a single prosecution •. , 
it is sufficient that the defendant sought to 
drive from one place to another, even though 
he committed several offenses in doing so. 
"Note: Multiple Prosecution and Punishment of Unitary 
Criminal Conduct," supra, at 661. (Emphasis added.) 
Petitioner submits that the definition of "single 
criminal episode" has been met. Because all charges 
occurred simultaneously and grew out of a single criminal 
objective, they comprise a "single criminal episode" 
under & 65-1-401. 
POINT II: PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION 
OF THE STATUTORY BARS RAISED BY § 76-1-402 
AND § 76-1-403 (1953) , AS AMENDED 
§ 76-1-402(1) and (2) (al (b) provides: 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode.--(1) A defendant may be prosecuted 
in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, 
where the same act of a defendant under a single 
criminal episode-5°hall establish offenses which may 
be punished in different ways under different pro-
visions of this code, the act shall be punishable 
under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars 
a prosecution under any other such provision. 
6 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate 
offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the 
court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple 
offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a 
single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney 
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. (Emphasis added.) 
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7 
Under the foregoing provisions of§ 76-1-402(1), where the 
~ act of the defendant is punishable under different 
provisions, a defendant shall be punished under only one 
such provision. The normally innocent act of driving 
becomes the only illegal and criminal act of the petitioner 
when combined with the other equally innocent acts of 
omission and/or commission involved in these charges, and 
this one act of driving is the only one which subjects the 
petitioner to punishment. Since he has already been 
punished (convicted and sentenced) under three other 
statutory provisions for this one act, both his prosecution 
and/or punishment under § 41-6-44 tl953), as amended, on a 
charge of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor, is barred. 
Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme 
Court, in his dissent in In re Hayes, supra, presents a 
very well reasoned discussion of the issues underlying 
problems involved in the application of statutes barring 
punishment for more than one offense arising out of a single 
criminal episode. He asserts that the legislative purpose 
behind the California statute was the determination that 
"essentially unitary criminal activity shall not be punished 
more than once regardless of how many distinct crimes it 
may comprise." (Emphasis added.) He goes on to find that 
the "act" which is made punishable under different provisions 
of the Code refers to "conduct significantly common to both," 
and not to the "entire criminal conduct proscribed by each 
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provision." Further, he continues "petitioner's single 
act of driving was an essential element, indeed the only 
active element, of the two crimes charged" and that 
petitioner was convicted of "a single act of driving while 
intoxicated and while his driving privilege was suspended. 
It is the singleness of that act which is determinative." 
A close reading of Chief Justice Traynor's dissent 
and a case-by-case comparison of the dissent with the 
majority opinion in In re Hayes can only lead to the 
conclusion that Traynor's characterization of "act" for 
the purposes of a statute barring multiple punishment of 
essentially unitary criminal activity is the correct one. 
He closes his dissent with the following observation 
It is a strange inversion that a defendant who 
commits an act that is the essential and crucial 
element of two crimes can be punished twice if 
that act by itself is innocent or the defendant's 
intent and objective are innocent, but can be 
punished only once if the common act or the 
intent and objective are criminal. 
Petitioner contends that his single act of driving, 
which established four offenses which may be punished in 
four different ways under the Utah Code, bars punishment 
under more than one such provision. Thus the previous 
convictions and sentences bar punishment for the present 
charge of driving under the influence of intoxicants, 
Should this Court, however, find that for the purposes 
of § 76-1-402, petitioner's conduct did not amount to a 
single act and thus bar punishment under more than one 
provision, his conduct does fall under the single criminal 
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episode statute and subsequent prosecution is barred by 
§ 76-1-403, which provides in relevant part 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent 
prosecution for offense out of same episode.--
(1} If a defendant has been prosecuted for one 
or more offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or 
a different offense arising out of the same 
criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense 
that was or should have been tried under section 
76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
* * * (ii) Resulted in conviction .•. lEmphasis added.) 
76-1-403(3) defines the term "conviction" as follows: 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution 
resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated ••• or a plea 
of guilty accepted by the court. (Emphasis added.) 
While the statute only requires a plea of guilty 
accepted by the court in its definition of "conviction," 
in this case the pleas of guilty were not only accepted 
by the court, but the petitioner was also sentenced on 
those charges. 
9 
Petitioner has thus met the requirements of § 76-1-403. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's sununary disposition of petitioner's appeal 
resulted in its incorrectly finding that petitioner's conduct 
consisted of offenses which were committed at different 
times.· It is clear in this case that all of the offenses 
occurred simultaneously. Defendant's act of driving was 
the common element to all the offenses, and the illegal 
criminal driving of the vehicle is the sole criminal 
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lo 
objective. Thus petitioner's conduct meets the requirements 
defined in the statute for single criminal episode. All 
charges were Class B misdemeanors, all under the jurisdiction 
of the Circuit Court, and could and should have been tried 
simultaneously. The petitioner, having entered a plea of, 
and been found guilty and sentenced on three of the offenses, 
is clearly entitled to the bar contained in § 76-1-401 et seg. 
The purpose of the legislature in enacting the "single 
criminal episode" statute was to mandate joinder of separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode which met 
the standards defined by the legislature, and to bar multiple 
prosecution for those offenses. By its refusal to find that 
petitioner's offenses are included in § 76-1-401 et seq., 
the Court appears to have thwarted the clear purpose of the 
legislature in enacting this legislation and thus judicially 
emasculated the single criminal episode statute. 
If it is finally determined that the facts of this case 
do not come under the prohibitions of § 76-1-401 et seq., 
then after considering this opinion and the previous decis~M 
of the Court on this subject it is difficult, if not impossibli 
to imagine a situation where said statute would apply! 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /~ day of February, 1980. 
~~· ::RICHARDS~<
Attorney for Peti tioner-Appellar: 
15 West Grove Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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APPENDIX "A" 
956 Colo. 563 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
the location and installation of basement 
doors other than that of providing a child 
proof barrier and a properly working latch 
is only incidental to the fulfillment of these 
purposes. We are constrained to observe 
that, as a "barrier" a door is designed to be 
opened, else a wall would suffice. Thus, we 
reject the trial court's finding and conclu-
sion as not supported by the evidence, see 
Anderson v. Cold Spring Tungsten, Inc., 170 
C-Olo 7, 458 P.2d 756; Holland Furnace Co. 
v. Robson, 157 Colo. 347, 402 P.2d 628. We 
do not, therefore, find it necessary to con-
sider whether the parties intended the ap-
plicable policy section as a separate insur-
able risk or as an exclusion from the policy. 
Cf. Jorgensen "· St. Paul Insurance Co., 
supra. 
[3] In considering the meaning of a 
written contract, the entire instrument 
should be considered, and meaning should 
be given to each provision of the agree-
ment. Gn"mes v. Barndollar, 58 Colo. 421, 
148 P. 256; New Brantner Extension Ditch 
C-0. v. Kramer, 57 Colo. 218, 141 P. 498. 
The "completed operations hazard" provi-
sion should therefore be interpreted in such 
a way as to give significance to each of its 
clauses. 
[4] In the context of this case, the im-
port of the last sentence of the provision at 
is;ue is that the defective latch did not 
prevent the basement door from being put 
to its intended use. Thus, the door comes 
within the area of completed operations and 
therefore injuries suffered as a result of the 
improper installation of the door latch are 
not covered by the policy. 
Judgment reversed. 
SILVERSTEIN, C. J., and PIERCE, J., 
cc,nc:ur. 
0 r .~,,..,,-u.-.-.. -,,-,1-, .~ 
T 
Joseph R. RUTH, Plaintiff-Appellant. 
v. 
The COUNTY COURT IN AND FOR the 
COUNTY OF EL PASO, and Judge 
James Quine, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 76-172. 
Colorado Court of Appeals, 
Div. I. 
Dec. 16, 1976. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 1977. 
Certiorari Granted May 9, 1977. 
Plaintiff who had entered plea of 
guilty to operating vehicle without valid 
operator's license sought relief in nature of 
writ of prohibition to preclude county court 
from proceeding further against him on 
traffic charges involving the same date, 
time and location. The District Court, El 
Paso County, William Rhodes, J., entered 
order dismissing the complaint and plaintiff 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Coyte, J., 
held that: (1) if the offenses sought to be 
tried are within the circumscription of join-
der statute, then trial court jurudiction is 
lacking and a writ of prohibition may prop-, 
erly issue; (2) plaintiff who had pleaded . 
guilty to the licensing offense had been 
subjected to prosecution within purview of 
joinder statute and any further proceedings 
would constitute a "subsequent" prosecu- , 
tion impermissible under the statute; (3) 
the licensing offense and charges that 
plaintiff had improperly backed his vehicle 
and struck another vehicle and that he left., 
the scene of the accident without attempt-
ing to notify the owner of the second vehi- · 
cle or making a report of the incident were 
not separate and distinct by reason of the 
applicability of both municipal and state. 
law. 
Reversed and remanded. 
l. Prohibition =5(4) 
·-.- -:::·.~ 
Prohibition may properly issue in a 
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RUTH v. COUNTY CT. IN AND FOR EL PASO COUNTY Colo. 957 
Cite as,, Colo.App .. 563 P.2d 956 
2. Prohibition <= 10(3) 
If offenses sought to be tried are with-
in the circumscription of statute requiring 
that all offenses must be prosecuted as a 
single prosecution when based on the same 
act or series of acts arising from the same 
criminal episode, then trial court jurisdic-
tion is lack;ng and writ of prohibition may 
properly issue. C.R.S. '73, 18-1-408(2). 
3. Criminal Law <=273.2(1) 
A guilty plea entered in good faith has 
the same effect as the verdict rendered by a 
jury. 
4. Criminal Law <11=200(1) 
Plaintiff who had pleaded guilty to op-
erating vehicle without valid operator's 
license had been subjected to prosecution 
within purview of statute requiring that all 
offenses must be prosecuted as a single 
prosec•;tion when based on the same act or 
seri : .,f acts arising from the same crimi-
nai ;ode, and any further proceedings 
agJ.. plaintiff on traffic offense charges 
invoi" ing the same date, time and location 
as the lic~nsing offense, would constitute a 
"subsequent" prosecution impermissible un-
der the statute. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule 106(a)(4); C.R.S. '73, 18-1-408(2), 42-
2-101, 42-4-112, 42-4-1404. 
5. Indictment and Information <= 129(1) 
Purpose of statute providing that all 
offenses must be prosecuted as a single 
prosecution when based on the same act or 
series of ects arising from the same crimi-
nal episode is to provide safeguards against 
harassment of defendants and unfair prose-
cutorial advantage. C.R.S. '73, 18-1-408(2). 
6. Indictment and Information <= 129(1) 
Concerns of public policy, such as 
avoidance of costly and repetitive trials as 
well as notions of constitutional due proc-
ess, require that statute providing that all 
offenses must be prosecuted as a single 
prosecution when based on the same act or 
series of acts arising from the same crimi-
nal episode be construed so as to effectuate 
the discernible objectives. C.R.S. '73, 18-1-
408(2). 
7. Criminal Law <=200(1) 
When prosecutor reasonably should be 
aware of separate charges against a defend-
ant arising from the same Criminal episode, 
the failure to prosecute all charges in a 
single action forecloses any further pro-
ceedings. C.R.S. '73, 18-1-408(2). 
8. Criminal Law = 129(1) 
Charges that defendant improperly 
backed his vehicle and struck another vehi-
cle, that he left scene of accident without 
attempting to notify owner of the second 
vehicle or making a report of the incident, 
and operating vehicle without valid opera-
tor's license, which charges arose from a 
single episode, were not separate and dis-
tinct by reason of applicability of both mu-
nicipal and state law and statute requiring 
joinder of all charges was applicable. Rules 
of Civil Procedure, rule 106(a)( 4); C.R.S. '73, 
18-1-408(2). 42-4-101, 42-4-112, 42-4-
1404. 
MacLaughlin, Ciccolella & Barton, John 
B. Ciccolella, Colorado Springs, for plain-
tiff-appellant. 
Robert L. Russel, Dist. Atty., James M. 
Franklin, Deputy Dist. Atty., Colorado 
Springs, for defendants-appellees. 
COYTE, Judge. 
Plaintiff appeals a district court order 
dismissing his complaint wherein he re-
quested relief in the nature of a writ of 
prohibition. We reverse. 
Plaintiff was charged in El Paso County 
Court on two different occasions with of-
fenses arising under the Motor Vehicle 
Law. The first action, consisting of two 
counts, was filed on January 20, 1975. The 
charges alleged that plaintiff had improper-
ly backed his vehicle and struck another 
vehicle, and that he left the scene of the 
accident without attempting to notify the 
owner of the second vehicle or making a 
report of the incident. See §§ 42-4-112 
and 42-4-1404, C.R.S.1973. Plaintiff en-
tered a plea of not guilty to these charges 
and the matter was set for trial. 
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On February 7, 1975, plaintiff was 
charged in the same county court in a sepa-
rate proceeding with the offense of having 
operated a vehicle without a valid opera-
tor's license in violation of § 42-2-101, C.R. 
S.1973. The date, time, and location speci-
fied in the charge were the same as those 
described in the first complaint. Plaintiff 
pied guilty to this latter offense and sen-
tence was imposed. 
Plaintiff thereafter moved in the county 
court for dismissal of the charges scheduled 
for trial, which motion was denied. He 
subsequently commenced the present litiga-
tion seeking to prohibit the county court 
from proceeding further against him. 
I. 
The initial question presented by this ap-
peal is whether relief in the nature of prohi-
bition, see C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), is an appropri-
ate remedy under the circumstances. We 
conclude that it is. 
The basis upon which plaintiff asserts his 
claim for relief is the compulsory joinder 
statute, § 18-1-408(2), C.R.S.1973, which 
provides that if several offenses are known 
to a district attorney at the commencement 
of prosecution, all such offenses must be 
prosecuted as a single prosecution when 
"based on the same act or series of acts 
arising from the same criminal episode." 
Offenses not so joined cannot be the subject 
of a later prosecution. 
(1) Defendants concede that prohibition 
may properly issue in a criminal proceeding, 
Bustamante v. District Court, 138 Colo. 97, 
329 P.2d 1013 (1958), but maintain that the 
trial court here possessed the requisite sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, and that according-
ly, plaintiff's remedy is limited to an appeal 
of the judgment entered in that criminal 
case. See People v. District Court, Colo., 
541 P.2d 683 (1975). We conclude that the 
defect in this proceeding is one which de-
prives the county court of jurisdiction. 
In Bustamante v. District Court, supra, 
our Supreme Court held that statutes of 
limitations in criminal cases operate as a 
bar to prosecution and are jurisdictional in 
nature. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
pointed out, a trial of a charge barred by a 
statute of limitation would be a "useless 
act" and an unnecessary expense to the 
public. 
(2) Similar considerations underlie the 
construction of a joinder statute. In pr<>-
viding that offenses not properly joined. 
cannot be a basis for subsequent prosecu-
tion, the legislature has explicitly surren-
dered the right to prosecute, as occurs with 
respect to statutes of limitation. Busta-·· 
man te v. District Court, supra; see general-
ly 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 154. The: · 
circumstances here are thus distinguishable 
from those cases in which the remedy of 
prohibition is denied when the adjudicative 
tribunal acts within its jurisdiction. See, e. · 
g., Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 
329 P.2d 781 (1958); Colorado State Board 
of Medical Examiners v. District Court, 138 
Colo. 227, 331 P.2d 502 (1958). Consequent-
ly, if the offenses sought to be tried are 
within the circumscription of§ 18-1-408(2), 
C.R.S.1973, then trial court jurisdiction is 
Jacking and a writ of prohibition may prop-
erly issue. 
II. 
Asserting that plaintiff entered a guilty 
plea to the licensing offense in order to · 
avoid subsequent prosecution, that the dis-
trict attorney had no knowledge of the-· ··• 
guilty plea, that the prosecution pending -
here is not "subsequent," and that different . 
evidence will be required to prove the alle:: · '':· 
gations in the two complaints, defendants• '"·.·_' 
contend that § 18-1-408(2), C.R.S.1973, · · ·:-' 
does not bar prosecution of plaintiff for tbe·;.:\ 
offenses charged under §§ 42-4-112 and, ;·, 
42-4-1404, C.R.S.1973. These argumen_ts :; ~. 
are unpersuasive_ _ -~ .i_~~ .. 
""'::~ (3, 4] Defendants admit that plaintiff • 1;.· 
did not act in a fraudulent manner in enter-· .. 
ing the plea of guilty, but argue however,· 
that the conviction was the result of collu- 0 
-}.: 
sion or connivance, which conduct should · .°' ~· 
estop plaintiff frcm asserting the matter of<=(i:· 
joinder. However, the ·authority relied~~';'.­
upon by defendants in support of this prop-.:.?'_'"':. 
osition, i. e., Hampton v. Municipal Court,··::•· 
242 CaLApp.2d 689, 51 Cal.Rptr. 760 (Dist.+<:·:. ' 
~~! 
: l 
- ~ ·I 
·--<. ·J 
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Ct.App.1966), relates to the defense of dou- the compulsory joinder statute requires that 
ble jeopardy raised by one who procured a plaintiff be granted the requested relief. 
prior conviction by fraud for the purpose of The order denying prohibition is reversed 
avoiding a greater punishment. See An- and the cause remanded with directions to 
not., 75 A.L.R.2d 683. In contrast, a guilty enter an order granting the writ in the 
plea entered in good faith has the same nature of prohibition. 
effect as a verdict rendered by a jury. 
Markiewicz v. Black, 138 Colo. 128, 330 P.2d 
539 (1958). Thus, under the circumstances 
present here, plaintiff has been subjected to 
prosecution within the purview of § 18-1-
408(2), C.R.S.1973, and any further proceed-
ings would constitute a "subsequent" prose-
cution impermissible under the statute. 
[&-7] The purpose of joinder statutes is 
to provide safeguards against harassment 
of defendants and unfair prosecutorial ad-
vantage. People v. Cooks, 186 Colo. 44, 525 
P.2d 426 (1974); and see Kellett v. Superior 
Court, 63 Cal.2d 822, 48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409 
P.2d 206 (1966). Additional concerns of 
public policy, such as the avoidance of cost-
ly and repetitive trials as well as notions of 
constitutional due process, see Ciucci v. 11/i-
nois, 356 U.S. 571, 78 S.Ct. 839, 2 L.Ed.2d 
983 (1958), require that these enactments be 
construed to as to effectuate their discerni-
ble objectives. Here, the district attorney 
maintained a file consisting of information 
forwarded by the court, and when a prose-
cutor reasonably should be aware of sepa-
rate charges against a defendant arising 
from the same criminal episode, the failure 
to prosecute all charges in a single action 
forecloses any further proceedings. See 
Weaver v. Schaaf, 520 S.W.2d 58 (Mo.1957). 
As to defendants' assertion that the of-
fenses with which plaintiff was charged did 
not possess the requisite commonality so as 
to fall within the scope of § 18-1--408(2), 
C.R.S.1973, we conclude that, under the per-
tinent authority in this jurisdiction, the test 
of identity of issues has been satisfied. 
(8] The charges alleged in this case 
were all based -on the violation of state 
statutes, arise from a single episode, and 
were to be prosecuted in the county court. 
The offenses, therefore, are not separate 
and distinct by reason of the applicability of 
both municipal and state law. See People 
v. Pinyan, Colo., 546 P.2d 488 (1976). Thus 
ENOCH and STERNBERG, JJ., 
w.__ ___ , 
o § KEYNU'il8E.RSYSTE~ 
T 
concur. 
Sophronia J. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 




Colorado Court of Appeals, 
Div. I. 
Jan. 13, 1977. 
Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1977. 
Certiorari Granted May 9, 1977. 
Motorist, whose car was struck from 
the rear by another car after it had been 
rear-ended by regional transportation dis-
trict's bus, brought action to recover 
against district and its employee-bus driver. 
The District Court, City and County of Den-
ver, Mitchel B. Johns, J., dismissed com-
plaint for failure to file 90-day notice pro-
vided for in Governmental Immunity Act, 
and motorist appealed. ' The Court of Ap-
peals, Enoch, J., held that (1) fact that 
district and its insurer were aware of acci-
dent and that they had made their own 
investigation of it did not constitute sub-
stantial compliance by plaintiff in regard to 
notice requirements of Act; (2) defendants 
were not equitably estopped from contend-
ing that motorist failed to file the notice 
required under Act; (3) fact that district 
carried liability insurance did not render 
notice requirements of Act inapplicable; (4) 
failure of motorist to comply with notice 
requirements did not preclude motorist 
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